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# “Force Multiplier”: How ICE is Promising Billions to Local Law Enforcement to Expand Its Reach in Dangerous Ways


In the summer of 2025, President Trump and Republicans in Congress passed a reconciliation bill, or “One Big Beautiful Bill,” that funneled a total of [\\$75 billion](#) to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), nearly tripling the agency’s prior (already historically high) annual budget, along with another \$116 billion to CBP and elsewhere at DHS. This is an extraordinary level of new spending that requires either new or existing infrastructure to absorb it. Coverage has fairly focused on [ICE](#) more than [doubling](#) its [workforce](#) and [converting](#) or [bringing online new detention centers](#), but there has been less focus on the way the vast and already built out criminal justice system is a key part of the ramp up in spending. ICE has found a new way to distribute billions of dollars throughout the United States, through a new funding model for an old, and once rejected, idea — the 287(g) Task Force Model. Based on current participation, we estimate **ICE could distribute between \$1.4 billion and \$2 billion to local and state law enforcement agencies in 2026**, adding thousands of additional law enforcement officers with immigration enforcement powers and putting communities throughout the country at increased risk of criminalization and incarceration.

## What is a 287(g) Task Force Model?

In 1996, Congress authorized the Attorney General to enter into agreements with local and state law enforcement agencies which allow their officers to carry out certain immigration enforcement actions under section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In essence, 287(g) is a set of parameters under which state and local law enforcement collaborate with the federal government to enforce immigration law. Over time, the form of these agreements shifted as national policy shifted, but most commonly these have been agreements between ICE and sheriffs offices to check immigration status

at jails, alert ICE to any immigrants in custody, and transfer immigrants from jail into ICE custody. Early on, these agreements were relatively rare, although other programs, including Secure Communities, were also used to push cooperation between local law enforcement and ICE. In the first Trump administration, the number of 287(g) agencies with agreements more than tripled from the previous administration. Under the current administration, they have increased almost 1000%. **In Trump's first term, there were approximately 150 total 287(g) agreements across the country, falling to 135 in January of 2025. As of January 26, 2026, there are 1,372 agreements across 1,169 agencies.**

**FIGURE 1: THE NUMBER OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS WENT UP OVER 900% IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SECOND TRUMP ADMINISTRATION**



During the early period of 287(g) agreements, another model known as the Task Force Model (TFM) was available. Under this model, deputies were trained by ICE to police and arrest people for civil immigration infractions in the community. This practice led to many harms including racial profiling, like documented abuses in [Maricopa County, Arizona](#) under [Sheriff Joe Arpaio](#) and in [Alamance County, North Carolina](#). Because of these abuses and public outcry, this model was discontinued by the Obama Administration at the end of 2012.

Immediately after taking office for the second time last January, President Trump revived the Task Force Model, signing up over two hundred agencies to this model within the first three months of his term.


## How Has the Task Force Model Changed in Trump's Second Term?

In September of 2025, as Task Force Model sign-ups slowed, ICE [announced](#) a new funding model for 287(g) TFM agreements. Previously, under 287(g) agreements, ICE paid for training and IT infrastructure for local law enforcement departments. In September, ICE announced that it would pay for the full salary and benefits of any trained and certified officer, one-time start-up costs to the agency, overtime, and bonuses based on "[performance](#)," i.e. how many immigration arrests officers make. This comes despite the Immigration and Nationality Act that lays out 287(g) powers stating that any designated officer "may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 8 USC 1357(g)(1)

**FIGURE 2: ICE ADVERTISES FUNDING UNDER THE HEADER “HOW CAN I CONVINCE MY CHIEF OR SHERIFF TO PARTICIPATE IN 287(G)?”**




Source: ICE, <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/287g/factsheet287gBenefits.pdf>

receive \$25 million for signing up for a Task Force Model agreement, [specifying that the total was contingent on each officer on the force being trained and making at least one immigration arrest](#) (a condition not noted in official ICE recruitment materials) although the [Chief of Police](#) and [City Council](#) declined.

Current ICE materials do not mention a date restriction on receiving funding, and agencies that have signed up after October have [admitted](#) they do not know if they will receive funding or not. ICE reportedly told Dallas that the money was [still available](#) in November.

Despite confusion about the availability of funding, Task Force Model sign-ups began to climb sharply after the funding was announced, reaching 81 new agencies in January 2026 alone. There are now 764 Task Force Model agreements across the country.


**FIGURE 3: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HAS PUSHED UNPRECEDENTED AND EXPLOSIVE GROWTH IN TASK FORCE MODEL AGREEMENTS**



Although in the past police departments were legally able to apply for 287(g) agreements, it was extremely rare for them to do so, with the vast majority of 287(g) agreements made with sheriffs. Under the second Trump administration, this has changed significantly. In fact, the majority (53%) of currently participating agencies are police departments, run by municipalities, rather than sheriffs departments run by counties. This greatly expands the scale and scope of the program, as there are approximately 12,000 local police departments, compared to only 3,000 sheriffs departments, and a commensurately greater number of sworn officers employed by local police departments. After the funding announcement, the National Fraternal Order of Police issued a [statement](#) urging departments to sign up for all three models, and highlighting the financial support in the Task Force Model.

#### FIGURE 4: POLICE DEPARTMENTS MAKE UP MAJORITY OF TASK FORCE MODEL AGREEMENTS

*Type of Agency, Task Force Model Agreements*




When [announcing](#) the new funding model in September 2025, ICE reported that 8,501 local law enforcement officers had already been trained under the Task Force Model — or approximately 18 per agency — and that 2,000 more were being trained. Since then, an additional 296 agencies have signed up for the Task Force Model. If they send similar numbers of officers for training, this would mean that **between 13,800 and 15,800 police officers and deputies** across the country are now deputized by ICE and trained to target immigrants, or anyone who they think looks like an immigrant. **This is an even larger increase in force than the 12,000 new officers and agents hired directly by ICE since Trump’s second inauguration.**

Money is clearly a key component of this system. At a minimum, to fund equipment and vehicle costs for agencies that signed up before October 1, 2025, we estimate that ICE has already distributed \$137 million to 517 agencies. If ICE honors its commitments to fully reimburse salaries and benefits for agencies who sign up for the Task Force Model, and provides “performance” bonuses, this would result in an unprecedented transfer of federal dollars to local and state law enforcement. For agencies signed up before October 1, we estimate this would result in an additional \$1.42 billion transfer to local law enforcement in 2026. If the agencies who have signed up between October 1 and January 26, 2026

are included, this would equal an additional \$58 million in funding for equipment and vehicles, \$483 million for salaries and benefits, and \$18 million for “performance” bonuses. All told, **just based on the current agencies signed up, this could mean a transfer of between \$1.4 and \$2 billion to local law enforcement in 2026.**

**If realized, this amount would dwarf all other federal funding for local law enforcement.** The two largest pots of federal money going to local police and other state and local law enforcement were COPS spending at \$665 million in FY24, and JAG-Byrne funds at \$346 million in FY24. Even with conservative estimates, this funding could double federal funds to local law enforcement.

**FIGURE 5: FEDERAL FUNDS SET TO GO OUT UNDER 287(G) TASK FORCE MODEL DWARF RECENT FEDERAL FUNDING TO LAW ENFORCEMENT**



If agency sign-ups continue at their current pace or even faster and are funded by ICE for all the promised benefits, this funding would continue to balloon. For example, if the current pace of sign-ups continues for an additional year, 2027 funding could grow to a total of \$3.6 billion in 2027, funding 31,000 law enforcement officers deputized by ICE across the country.

## What Does This Mean for Communities Across the U.S.?

ICE refers to 287(g) agreements as “force multipliers” and **pushing billions into local law enforcement with a mandate and incentives to harass and arrest people who may appear to be immigrants is an enormous multiplier of force against Black and Brown people in this country.** In the last year, ICE and CBP have arrested [over 380,000 people](#), including an [11x increase in arrests on the street](#). The administration has set a quota of [arresting 3,000 people a day](#) or over 1 million people a year. Because 287(g) agreements are spread across the country, as we will explore more in a future brief, their rapid expansion greatly increases ICE’s ability to meet their quotas and puts immigrants at risk in communities far outside the urban areas the administration has publicly targeted for ICE surges.

At the same time, the massive infusion of federal funding into local law enforcement could expand local police departments and sheriff’s offices in a way not seen since the 1990s. From 1995 to 1999, the federal government sent nearly \$1 billion per year to state and local law enforcement agencies to hire more police officers through the COPS program. While studies have found that funding had [no](#) or [very modest](#)

impact on crime, it did significantly increase arrests for drug possession and other low level offenses, and coincided with a period of militarization of police around the country. These harms persisted even after the funding was reduced. This new money comes with very little [training](#) or [oversight](#), and in a period of increasing criminalization despite [record crime declines](#). It will allow local and state law enforcement agencies to [expand their budgets](#) in unaccountable and harmful ways. Once in place, these agreements and budgets become the new baseline and will be very hard to unwind.

This is alarming on its own, but particularly in conjunction with the large body of research showing the harms 287(g) agreements can have even without the expansion of funding. In addition to the direct racial profiling documented in counties running the original Task Force Model, research found [spillover effects](#) of increased racial profiling in nearby areas that were not covered by an agreement. Other documented negative impacts include [increased chronic absenteeism of children from school](#), [decreased employment](#), [worsened mental health](#), and [increased vulnerability of immigrants to crime](#) in counties with 287(g) agreements during the earlier TFM era. **All of these negative effects were not balanced by any positives: these programs had [no measurable effect on crime](#).**

As shocking as this rapid expansion is, we have seen periods of increased criminalization and federal funding that led to increased attacks on Black and Brown people before. The public pushed back, and [experienced a 15-year period in which incarceration and crime rates declined simultaneously](#), including decreases in violent crime rates in states that reduced imprisonment while rates went up in those that did not. Now we must recognize these threats for what they are and push back forcefully again, refusing to participate in or banning 287(g) agreements, tracking and understanding the impact of agreements when they are made, and rejecting funding that institutionalizes and incentivizes harm.

## *Research and writing by Felicity Rose*

### *Data/Methodology*

Information on current 287(g) agreements was downloaded from GitHub's [287\(g\) Tracking project](#) on January 29, 2026 and analyzed by [FWD.us](#). The participating agencies spreadsheet comes from the ICE website and may include agencies that have withdrawn participation, as noted in [this](#) news article.

Funding estimates were made using the median salary for police officers from the 2024 [American Community Survey](#) and a benefits multiplier of 33%.

### *About FWD.us*

FWD.us is a policy organization working to advance better and more politically resilient solutions on criminal justice and immigration. For too long, our harmful criminal justice and immigration systems have held us back and been weaponized in ways that undermine our nation's promise and democratic ideals. For over a decade, FWD.us has advanced criminal justice and immigration reforms that expanded freedom and opportunities to tens of millions of people in the United States. Working with partners in red, blue, and purple jurisdictions, we have secured legislative and judicial victories and executive actions despite often-challenging political conditions.